By David Pears
Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy is a concise and readable learn of 5 intertwined issues on the center of Wittgenstein's concept, written by means of one among his most outstanding interpreters. David Pears bargains penetrating investigations and lucid explications of a few of the main influential and but perplexing writings of twentieth-century philosophy. He specializes in the belief of language as an image of the area; the phenomenon of linguistic regularity; the well-known "private language argument"; logical necessity; and ego and the self.
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Additional resources for Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy
Sample text
But both these insights need to be developed and explained in detail. Before that task is undertaken, we need a more detailed identification of the target of Wittgenstein’s critique. ⁵ According to Carnap, our sensations are bracketed between stimuli and responses and each of us really speaks two languages: one specifying our sensations in physical terms based on the stimuli that produce them and on the responses that they, in their turn, produce, and the other specifying them in purely sensory terms.
Logical Atomism was explicitly rejected in 1929, ⁹ because it was impossible to see how elementary propositions could be logically independent of one another, but the Picture Theory simply faded out, apparently without receiving a mortal blow. It is true that there is some critical discussion of its details in the years immediately after Wittgenstein’s resumption of philosophy in 1929, but nothing so devasting as his critique of Logical Atomism. So what is the explanation of the difference? It is a plausible suggestion that the Picture Theory was outflanked by other developments in his philosophy and left to capitulate without any direct assault.
A quick diagnosis of this misunderstanding would be that we treat the future performance as if it were already actualized in the present state of the person’s mind, or in the present arrangement of the working parts of the clock. Of course, nobody believes either of these two things because it is too obviously always possible that something may go wrong, and, even if all goes according to our expectations, the performance belongs ineradicably to the future. But we are apt to be fooled by the vividness of our own symbolism, which does everything possible to bring the future forward into the present, without really meaning it.