By Jerry A. Fodor
In a compelling protection of the speculative method of the philosophy of brain, Jerry Fodor argues that, whereas our greatest present theories of cognitive psychology view many larger strategies as computational, computation itself presupposes an inner medium of illustration. Fodor's leading matters are to buttress the concept of inner illustration from a philosophical point of view, and to figure out these features of this conceptual build utilizing the empirical info on hand from linguistics and cognitive psychology.
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Additional info for The Language of Thought
Example text
1 assume that the laws of basic science are strictly exceptionless, and I assume that it is common knowledge that the laws of the special sciences us to see why are special sciences at all. These Consider, again, the model of reduction are not. But now we have a dilemma to face. Since ‘—‘ expresses a relation (or relations) which must be transitive, formula (1) can have exceptions only if the bridge laws do. But if the bridge laws have exceptions, reductionism loses its since ontological bite, which consists of the satisfaction of satisfaction of a consistently while P-predicate.
Thus, find it easier to learn to sort together all things prefer affirmative negative or disjunctive subjects in the concept sort all the red triangles that aren’t triangles or all conjunctive things triangles are interdefinable with hypotheses negative disjunctive hypotheses; the subject who is choosing all and only red triangles as instances of positive stimuli is ipso facto choosing all and only things that are (not triangles or not red) as are either instances of the or negative red. , the way he represents the choices.
Confirmation of a the philosophy of science. The classic argument is due to Goodman who pointed out that, for any fixed set of observations of grcen emeralds, both the hypothesis that all emeralds are green and the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue will be compatible with the data. (One way of defining a grue-predicate is: An emerald is grue if it is ((in the data (1965), and sample green) (not in the data sample and blue)). ) Since both hypotheses are compatible with the data, the principle that distinguishes between them must appeal to something other grue than observations of green emeralds.