By Professor Bradley Armour-Garb, Professor James A. Woodbridge
During this e-book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish quite a few species of fictionalism, finding and protecting their very own model of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that come up from traditional language, they think about such concerns because the challenge of non-being, plural id claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, which means attributions, and truth-talk. they think about 'deflationism approximately truth', explaining why deflationists could be fictionalists, and convey how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its family members. They additional discover the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, displaying how philosophical fictionalism may also get to the bottom of puzzles that those notions seem to current. Their serious exam of fictionalist techniques in philosophy, including the improvement and alertness in their personal model of philosophical fictionalism, may be of serious curiosity to students and upper-level scholars of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical common sense, philosophy of brain, epistemology, and linguistics
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Extra info for Pretense and pathology : philosophical fictionalism and its applications
Example text
809. Yablo (1996), Crimmins (1998), Kroon (2001). For earlier presentations of our views, see Woodbridge (2005) and Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2010a and 2012a). 6 Philosophical fictionalism and other distinctions 33 (11) There might have been blue swans. gets analyzed in terms of a claim about a plurality of concrete worlds, such as (12) There is a (non-actual) possible world, w, such that, in w, there are blue swans. according to Rosen’s modal fictionalism, it should be understood along the lines of (13) According to PW, there is a (non-actual) possible world, w, such that in w, there are blue swans.
The prior distinction is concerned with implementation – that is, with the way that the account appeals to the notion of fiction. In contrast, the distinction between ETF and PIF focuses on the assumed semantic status of the sentences from the target discourse. While every fictionalist account views the sentences from its target discourse as being such that, if given face-value readings, they would be semantically infelicitous, not every fictionalist account makes the ETF assumption that a face-value reading is what the proper, standard reading of these sentences involves.
Thus, further refinement of a semantic characterization is required. We think that, properly formulated, a characterization of fictionalism should remain uncommitted as to whether a face-value reading of the sentences being given a fictionalist analysis is the default or standard reading they should receive. We also think that specifying falsity (or even just not being true) as the semantic status that (meta)fictive sentences receive on a face-value reading is too quick, for reasons (pertaining to alethic evaluability) that we will explain in Chapter 5.