By Kristina Musholt
In this publication, Kristina Musholt deals a singular idea of self-consciousness, understood because the skill to contemplate oneself. regularly, self-consciousness has been important to many philosophical theories. extra lately, it has develop into the point of interest of empirical research in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt attracts either on philosophical concerns and on insights from the empirical sciences to provide a brand new account of self-consciousness -- the facility to consider ourselves that's on the middle of what makes us human.
Examining theories of nonconceptual content material constructed in fresh paintings within the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a version for the slow transition from self-related details implicit within the nonconceptual content material of conception and other kinds of expertise to the categorical illustration of the self in conceptual concept. a vital a part of this version is an research of the connection among self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and knowledge of others, Musholt argues, are aspects of an identical coin.
After surveying the philosophical challenge of self-consciousness, the proposal of nonconceptual content material, and numerous proposals for the life of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist idea, in keeping with which the self isn't a part of the representational content material of conception and physically knowledge yet a part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes among implicitly self-related info and specific self-representation, and describes the transitions from the previous to the latter as bobbing up from a fancy strategy of self--other differentiation. by way of this account, either self-consciousness and intersubjectivity increase in parallel.
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Additional resources for Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self
Sample text
Mental states such as being in pain or entertaining a thought are traditionally regarded as being among the strongest candidates for these. ) One potential counterexample against the existence of such evidence bases is the phenomenon of thought insertion that sometimes occurs in patients suffering from schizophrenia. ’ It’s just like my mind working, but it isn’t. They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts” (Frith, 1992, p. 66). John Campbell (1999) takes this to be a counterexample to the immunity principle.
21 In other words, introspective awareness of a thought is sufficient to make it your own—and would therefore make a self-ascription on the basis of such introspective awareness rational—even if it does not guarantee that you will in fact ascribe that thought to yourself. 5 The Problem of Self-Consciousness Returns Let us take stock. We started with the observation that we seem to be aware of (some) of our mental and bodily states from the first-person perspective, which is to say that we seem to have direct, immediate access to these states.
However, it cannot misrepresent the subject purportedly possessing that property. In other words, such a thought can “what”-misrepresent, but it cannot “who”-misrepresent (Meeks, 2006). The reason for this, according to Wittgenstein, Shoemaker and Evans, is that these self-ascriptions do not involve the identification of a subject. As Evans (1982) puts it, such judgments do not contain an identification component. If no identification of a subject is involved, it is impossible to misidentify it.