By Duncan Pritchard
This quantity contains 3 special investigations into the connection among the character and the worth of data. every one is written through one of many authors in session with the opposite . 'Knowledge and realizing' (by Duncan Pritchard) significantly examines virtue-theoretic responses to the matter of the price of information, and argues that the eventually useful cognitive nation isn't wisdom yet knowing. 'Knowledge and popularity' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of data during which the assumption of a recognitional skill performs a favorite position, and argues that this account permits us greater to appreciate wisdom and its worth. 'Knowledge and motion' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of information and justification and is the reason why wisdom is efficacious, and permits us to make feel of the data we have now of our intentional activities.
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Extra info for The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Interestingly, however, Kvanvig does not offer his epistemic value pluralism as a means of rescuing the intuition that knowledge is epistemically more valuable than mere true belief, since he instead uses the swamping argument to demonstrate that we are mistaken in thinking that knowledge is a particularly valuable epistemic standing, as opposed to understanding. ¹⁶ I don’t think that this can be the full story, however, for while Kvanvig argues that understanding is not a species of knowledge, he does not argue for the stronger claim that it is never the case that when one knows a proposition one’s true belief also has the relevant epistemic property of understanding.
This view is entirely compatible with epistemic value T-monism. The other two responses, in contrast, maintain that knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good and hence reject epistemic value Tmonism. The ﬁrst approach—the monistic response—argues that knowledge is the only fundamental epistemic good, and hence blocks the swamping problem by appeal to a different form of epistemic value monism (epistemic value K-monism). The second approach—the pluralist response—instead puts forward a form of epistemic value pluralism which holds that both knowledge and true belief are fundamental epistemic goods.
In order to see this, notice that part of what is at issue in the wider debate about epistemic value is the central role that knowledge plays in epistemological enquiry. If it were to turn out, however, that knowledge is only of greater epistemic value than mere true belief because of the greater epistemic value of a necessary component of knowledge (still less, a nonnecessary component), then that would surely threaten the central role that knowledge plays in epistemological theorizing almost as much as the claim that knowledge is never of greater epistemic value than mere true belief.