By Janice Thomas
Again and again, philosophers go back to the good early sleek rationalist and empiricist philosophers for guide and idea. Their perspectives at the philosophy of brain aren't any exception and, as Thomas indicates, they've got a lot to provide modern debates.
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Additional info for The Minds of the Moderns: Rationalism, Empiricism, and Philosophy of Mind
Sample text
His answer is importantly qualified and therefore not as helpful to the interpretation I am criticizing as its friends might have hoped. He says that it is the same “I” who doubts, and so on, and who also: has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a sensory perception” is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.
59–67. 40 H UM A N C ON S C IOU SN E S S A N D T H E R AT IONA L S OU L perception of what is occurring in the subject’s mind. With such self-conscious awareness of the contents and present activities of one’s own mind we reach a kind of consciousness that Descartes regards as a central capacity and proper purpose of the rational soul. In Chapter 2, § “The second sort of self-knowledge”, we saw that Descartes thinks the rational soul gives me introspective immediate awareness of all my ideas, including what sensations and sense experiences I am having.
But it is also unlikely that he would have recognized a category of animal (including human animal) passions, impulses and sensations and yet regarded them as involving no sort of feeling or phenomenology for their possessors. Introspective consciousness Armstrong argues that what he calls “perceptual consciousness” differs from something he calls “introspective consciousness”,12 which consists of selfscanning activity by the subject: a variety of “inner sense” or higher-order 12. ”, 59–67. 40 H UM A N C ON S C IOU SN E S S A N D T H E R AT IONA L S OU L perception of what is occurring in the subject’s mind.