By Michel Henry
This book’s easy argument is that the Freudian subconscious, faraway from constituting an intensive holiday with the philosophy of cognizance, is basically the newest exemplar in a background of philosophical false impression of the Cartesian cogito that translates I imagine, consequently i'm” as I characterize myself, for this reason i'm” (in the vintage interpretation of Heidegger, one of many objectives of the book).
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Additional info for The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis
Sample text
And what can it mean for appearance to present or withdraw itself, to present itself in withdrawing itself? What does it mean for the truth of being, for pure appearance, to deliver itself as the truth of beings in the veiling of its own truth if this truth is not phenomenological material of an actual mode of pure phenomenality? In fact, no concept, especially not phenomenality's, goes without reference. As soon as the word appearance is uttered, we understand, 42 The Decline of Phenomenological Absolutes at least implicitly, an actual, nonarbitrary mode of pure phenomenality.
Therefore, only by taking the modes of sensation and imagination as they are posed and advanced by the power of their own phenomenality can they be exhibited as pertaining to thought, and in turn this "thought" signifies nothing but that very phenomenality. Moreover, such modes are modes of thought solely because they manifest themselves in and by it, in that pure phenomenality inherent in both. This is also why the definition of thought by the enumeration of its modes does not establish any discrimination between them, because, circumscribed by their phenomenality and exhibiting themselves equally in it, they all have the same rights.
Nonetheless, seeing itself has fallen under the attack of reduction. So it cannot found sensation and imagination, nor can it establish them as those modes of thought, collected in the second definition, that escape reduction with absolute certainty, nor could the intellectus itself do this if it were not supported in its depths by the power of a more original mode of appearance, irreducible to the intellectus and moreover incontestable. We will demonstrate that not the videre of seeing but only the more original semblance of videor determines both the "certitude" of thought and its inherent modes by examining one of these modes, mentioned not less than five times in the second definition (" dubitans, afftrmans, negans, volens, nolens")—namely, volition.