Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the by Jesse Butler (auth.)

By Jesse Butler (auth.)

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Suppose, for instance, that you cut open my head or place me in an fMRI in such a way that I can directly observe my own brain states. It seems absurd to say that I would be introspecting in this case. Even if I had a complete understanding of the brain, being able to accurately correlate specific neural events with specific subjective experiences or cognitive states, I would not be experiencing or understanding my Poking Out the Inner Eye 23 mentality in the same first-personal way that I do through introspection.

32 Rethinking Introspection This leads to yet another basis for rejecting the idea that introspection is a kind of perception: There appears to be no identifiable functional/ adaptive process that serves the purpose of perceiving one’s own mental states. This is related to my initial objection regarding the absence of an introspection organ, but shifts the focus away from the organ toward the function it supposedly performs. In order to get a handle on this objection, let us first look at an account that suggests the opposite.

Since no such brain-observing process can be identified, the perceptual account is fundamentally ungrounded in the concrete natural world we all live in. Another response here is to suggest that inner perception occurs through a brain process, but one that we cannot currently identify. Perhaps inner perception is a distributed higher-order neural network that is not precisely localizable in neurophysiological terms. Arguing along these lines, in response to the criticism that there is no identifiable inner perception mechanism in the brain, B.

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