By Michael Watkins (auth.)
In Rediscovering shades: A research in Pollyanna Realism, Michael Watkins endorses the Moorean view that colours are easy, non-reducible, homes of items. hence, Watkins breaks from what has turn into the acquired view that both shades are reducible to definite houses of curiosity to technology, otherwise not anything is de facto coloured. what's novel concerning the paintings is that Watkins, not like different Mooreans, takes heavily the metaphysics of colours. for that reason, Watkins presents an account of what colours are, how they're on the topic of the actual homes on which they supervene, and the way shades should be causally efficacious with out the specter of causal overdetermination. alongside the best way, he offers novel bills of ordinary stipulations and non-human colour houses. The e-book might be of curiosity to any metaphysician and thinker of brain attracted to colours and colour perception.
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Additional resources for Rediscovering Colors: a Study in Pollyanna Realism
Example text
This is perhaps the best of the three alternatives, but it is not satisfactory. According to this suggestion 0, though it looks uniformly colored, is actually multi-colored. Thus, casual observation does not (and can never) tell us what color the object has. ° ° ° ° ° 23 I thank Diana Raffman for this insight, offered in conversation. 44 CHAPTER 2 4. , the purported fact that only Physicalism is consistent with the causal nature of colors), it must maintain that many of the things we correctly describe as red have no color in common.
Consequently, Disjunctive Physicalism and relational accounts seem to be on an equal footing vis-a-vis their ability (or inability) to account for the causaVexplanatory nature of colors. Given that it is just Physicalism's purported ability to identify colors with the causes of color experiences that 38 CHAPfER2 supposedly provides Physicalism with its advantage, and given that the most plausible semantics for color predicates consistent with Physicalism assumes that colors are causally efficacious, this is a serious blow.
WHY COLORS ARE NOT PHYSICAL PROPERTIES 43 (I) When we say of objects 01 and 02 that they are red, we take ourselves to be ascribing the same property to two objects. What we would like to know, I take it, is in virtue of what are both 01 and 02 red? What feature do these objects share? But if 01 and 02 cause the same experience in virtue of their having different physical properties, then they do not have the same color. Thus, in so far as we take ourselves to be ascribing the same property to different objects, we are mistaken according to the Jackson and Pargetter account.