By J.Adam Carter
Is wisdom relative? Many lecturers around the humanities say that it truly is. even though those that paintings in mainstream epistemology ordinarily think of that it's not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions no matter if the type of anti-relativistic history that underlies commonplace tasks in mainstream epistemology can on nearer inspection be vindicated.
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Extra resources for Metaepistemology and Relativism
Example text
After all, it would seem Global Relativism 39 that only if we are operating with an unrelativised truth predicate will the falsity of M for Protagoras’s opponent imply that it must also be false for Protagoras himself (who judges it true). But Protagoras’s doctrine does not say that if someone judges that x, then x is true (full stop). And so from the measure doctrine, in conjunction with the premise he is obliged to grant – that his opponent judges M to be false – Protagoras is really only left in a spot where he must admit the following, as Burnyeat (1976) calls it, ‘interim conclusion’: Interim Conclusion (IC): The measure doctrine is false for Protagoras’s opponents.
There are no perspectiveindependent epistemic facts. If we suppose there is another perspective, the perspective of Astrology, then relative to that perspective, it might be that the doctor’s belief is epistemically unjustified; the relativist denies there is any further perspective-independent fact of the matter, about which perspective is ‘right’. To reiterate, epistemic relativism comes in (much) more complicated versions than the one just outlined – several of which we’ll consider in further chapters – but this simplification of Rorty’s view will do for now, in so far as I want to close this chapter by setting up a kind of ‘cliffhanger’ to do with the relationship between mainstream epistemology and epistemic relativism.
Moore), or whether it is not. They both agree that either Moore knows there is an external world, or that the sceptic is right and he does not. g. as might be the case if epistemic facthood was just a matter of Moore’s or the sceptic’s opinion, or what is licensed by their respective cultural mores, and nothing more. (Recall DeRose’s observation that ‘each is publicly indicating that they are (or at least mean to be) contradicting the other, by saying such things as, “No, you’re wrong. I do know”’).