Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure by Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant and Nan Zhang (Auth.)

By Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant and Nan Zhang (Auth.)

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8: else if β R = 0 then 9: γ ← βA p/(1 − p + βA p). 10: end if 11: Wait until t > tD or an attack is detected. 12: if t > tD then 13: STATUS ← ESTABLISHED. 14: else if STATUS = ESTABLISHED then 15: Go to 1; 16: else 17: tD ← t + l 0 . 4. INTENT-BASED ADVERSARY MODEL FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS In this section, we first describe participating parties of Tor in an intent-based view. We formalize the problem as a repeated noncooperative game between the defender and the adversary. Given the current path selection algorithm of Tor, we derive an optimal attack strategy or the adversary according to its utility function, followed by an optimal defensive strategy against this attack.

In a system with na¨ıve attackers, the defender’s reputation of toughness from the view of an insider Ai is defined as Equation 2-24 rR (i ) = Pr{β R < β 0 | outcomes for A1 , . . , Ai −1 }. Based on this definition, the basic steps of our reputation-establishment algorithm for systems with na¨ıve attackers can be described as follows. Similar to Algorithm 1, there are two steps: reputation-building and reputationestablished. The reputation-building step is essentially the same as Algorithm 1, with the exception of replacing β D with β R .

Nash Equilibrium represents an action profile for all players in a game and is used to predict the outcome of their decisionmaking interaction. , a combination of strategies of all players) in which no player can benefit by unilaterally changing its strategy. If a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the game, then all players are expected to converge to the state represented by the equilibrium if they are all rational – that is, each player aims to choose CHAPTER 2 Game Theory for Infrastructure Security: The Power of Intent-Based Adversary Models the strategy that maximizes its utility function.

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