By Stuart Brock, Anthony Everett
11 unique essays talk about more than a few perplexing philosophical questions on fictional characters, and extra normally approximately fictional items. for instance, they ask questions just like the following: Do they honestly exist? What might fictional gadgets be like in the event that they existed? Do they exist ceaselessly? Are they created? Who through? whilst and the way? Can they be destroyed? if that is so, how? Are they summary or concrete? Are they real? Are they whole items? Are they attainable gadgets? what percentage fictional gadgets are there? What are their identification stipulations? What forms of attitudes will we have in the direction of them? This quantity might be a landmark within the philosophical debate approximately fictional gadgets, and should effect higher-level debates inside of metaphysics, the philosophy of brain, and the philosophy of language.
Read or Download Fictional Objects PDF
Best consciousness & thought books
Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues (Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity)
Self and identification were very important but unstable notions in psychology considering its early life as a systematic self-discipline. lately, psychologists and different social scientists have started to advance and refine the conceptual and empirical instruments for learning the complicated nature of self. This quantity provides a severe research of primary matters within the clinical research of self and id.
Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content
The writer defends nonconceptualism, the declare that perceptual adventure is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content material. carrying on with the heated and complicated debate surrounding this subject during the last 20 years, she deals a sustained safety of a singular model of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and gives a scientific review of a few of the vital controversies within the debate.
Meaning in life and why it matters
Most folks, together with philosophers, are likely to classify human factors as falling into certainly one of different types: the egoistic or the altruistic, the self-interested or the ethical. in line with Susan Wolf, even if, a lot of what motivates us doesn't conveniently healthy into this scheme. frequently we act neither for our personal sake nor out of responsibility or an impersonal quandary for the realm.
The importance of how we see ourselves : self-identity and responsible agency
The earlier fifteen years have noticeable a wellspring of curiosity within the proposal and functional nature of the self. questions on the metaphysics of private id have preoccupied philosophical scholarship. much less recognition has been paid to the subject of the self from the first-person perspective, the viewpoint of somebody who regards convinced phenomena as precise of and necessary to her id.
- The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy
- Dream Psychology
- Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3
- A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Hackett Classics)
- Did My Genes Make Me Do It: And Other Philosophical Dilemmas
Additional resources for Fictional Objects
Sample text
Philosophical Studies 32: 383–91. ’ Noûs 1: 1–8. ’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66: 471– 88. ’ Philosophical Review 83: 3–32. ’ Philosophical Studies 45: 95–142. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ’ Poetica 8: 129–77. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. ’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 197–217. Reprinted (with preface) as Kripke (1980). ’ In Kripke (2011). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52: 207–14.
There may be subtle differences between these approaches, but we can ignore these for our purposes here. (15) For a view of this kind see Brock (2002). And Ross Cameron (2012) argues that the truth of such sentences need not commit us to fictional objects as we can give an account of their truthmakers without needing to invoke such things (see also Cameron, 2008 and 2010). (17) See for example the adverbial account of intentionality suggested by Kriegel (2007) and (2008). Crimmins (1998) offers a pretence theoretic account of Hob-Nob sentences.
Journal of Philosophy 73: 127–35. ’ Philosophical Review 92: 49–66. ’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 12: 73–99. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 35: 9–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 49–77. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ’ Mind 67: 166–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ’ American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 299–308. ’ Journal of Philosophy 75: 5–27. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.