By Yanjiao Chen, Qian Zhang
This short explores present study on dynamic spectrum auctions, targeting primary public sale concept, features of the spectrum industry, spectrum public sale structure and attainable public sale mechanisms. The short explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which permit new clients to realize spectrum entry and current spectrum vendors to procure monetary advantages, can significantly increase spectrum potency via resolving the unreal spectrum scarcity. It examines why operators and clients face major demanding situations because of area of expertise of the spectrum industry and the similar necessities imposed at the public sale mechanism layout. Concise and up to date, Dynamic Spectrum public sale in instant communique is designed for researchers and pros in desktop technology or electric engineering. scholars learning networking also will locate this short a worthy source.
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Extra resources for Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication (SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering)
Example text
S s s s • CASE I. wi,j = 0, wi,j = 0. In this case, Ui,j = Ui,j = 0. s s s s ≥ 0 due to individual • CASE II. wi,j = 1, wi,j = 0. In this case, Ui,j = 0, Ui,j rationality. s s • CASE III. wi,j = 1, wi,j = 1. In this case, the seller is paid the group bid, s s = Ui,j . independent of his ask. Ui,j s s s , in • CASE IV. wi,j = 0, wi,j = 1. It can only happen when ri,j < Φj < ri,j = vi,j s s s which Φj is the group bid. In this case, Ui,j = Φj − vi,j < 0 = Ui,j . In summary, the seller cannot improve its utility gained from a certain spectrum by misreporting the ask for that spectrum.
Therefore, the buyer does not gain higher utility by being untruthful. • Case II. Buyer j wins the spectrum si when he bids truthfully and loses the spectrum si when he bids untruthfully. In the former case, he achieves nonnegative utility due to individual rationality. In the later case, he achieves zero utility. Therefore, the buyer has higher utility when being truthful. • Case III. Buyer j wins the spectrum si when he bids truthfully and untruthfully, and he pays the same price according to Lemma 13.
We assume that the objective of the auctioneer is to maintain a balanced budget at each time slot, that is, Uta ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, · · · , T . At each time stage t, all buyers submit their spectrum requests to the auctioneer, then the auctioneer decides the spectrum allocation and the corresponding payments. The auction results are represented by a 3-dimensional matrix Xi,j ,t , i ∈ [1, M], j ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [1, T ]. At time stage t, if the auctioneer decides to allocate the spectrum si to buyer j for tj time slots, then xi,j ,t = 1, xi,j ,t+1 = 1, .